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VOLUME 24 FEBRUARY, 1949 NUMBER I
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
IN THE UNITED STATES
YI-SENG K ANG*ON MAY 3, 1948 THE SuPREME COURT of the United States handed
Udown two decisions prohibiting judicial enforcement of racial
restrictive covenants on real property I It has been a peculiar feature
of American life that residential segregation of designated minority
groups from certain prescribed areas is a common practice in all
major cities. This policy of racial discrimination at first was enforced
by municipal ordinance, beginmng with that of Baltimore in 91o ,
and quickly followed by Atlanta, Richmond, Louisville, and other
cities, until it was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court m 1917 2
Thereafter restrictive covenants became the principal weapon of
enforcing segregation through judicial tribunals. Thirty-two years
elapsed before the Supreme Court was finally prepared to take up the
constitutional issue of their enforceability by the courts. in this period
the racial covenant had been skillfully developed into an insuperable
barrier against minorities m their attempt to obtain decent living
quarters. At present when the postwar shortage of housing is most
acute, it became at once clear how desperate has been the plight of the
* Consul General of the Republic of China, Los Angeles. The views expressed in
this article are strictly those of the author and do not in any way reflect those of the
Chinese Foreign Office.I Shelley v. Kraemer (No. 72), McGhee v. Sipes (No. 87) 68 S. Ct. 836 (1948),
Hurd v. Hodge (No. 290), Urciolo v. Hodge (No. 291) 68 S. Ct. 847 (1948).
2 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 38 S. Ct. 16 (1917).
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excluded groups. Now that these private agreements have been denied
their force of judicial sanction, it is the purpose of this article to discuss
their nature and scope, their legal status before the recent decisions,
the reasons for these decisions and their general effects on minorities,
and finally certain international aspects of the issues involved.
THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
For the purposes of this article, a restrictive covenant may be
defined as a condition in deeds or a private agreement between prop-
erty owners excluding designated groups of persons from the owner-
ship or occupancy of real property because of their race, color, creed,
or national origin. The basic aim of these restrictions renders it irrel-
evant to inquire whether the excluded person is a citizen of the United
States or whether his social and economic station in life deserves any
consideration, a person is excluded solely because of what he is, not
because of what he does.
In general, there are three kinds of restrictive covenants: (i) those
restricting sale, lease, conveyance to, or ownership by members of a
designated racial or religious group, (2) those restricting use or occu-
pancy by that group; and (3) those restricting both ownership and
use or occupancy by that group.' An example of the first kind is found
in a covenant which provides "that said lot shall never be rented,
leased, sold, transferred, or conveyed unto any Negro or colored per-
son."4 One of the second is contained in a common provision. "This
property shall not be used or occupied by any person or persons except
those of the Caucasian race."' The third is illustrated by "the restric-
tion that no part of said premises shall be sold, given, conveyed or
leased to any Negro or Negroes, and no permission or license to use
or occupy any part thereof shall be given to any Negro. "' The
parties to a covenant involve not only the interested group of property
owners but also cooperating agencies such as real estate boards or
brokers or neighborhood improvement associations. When newly devel-
oped lands are subdivided into individual lots for sale to prospective
home owners, it is now almost a universal practice for the subdivider
or grantor to write into the title deed to property the usual conditions
" Clark, Tom C., Attorney General, and Perlman, P B., Solicitor General, Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Nos. 72, 87, 290, 291 in the Supreme Court
of the United States, October Term, 1947, p. 26.
4 Hurd v. Hodge (No. 290), Urciolo v. Hodge (No. 291) note 1 supra.
5 McGhee v. Sipes (No. 87) note 1 supra.
6 LONG AND JOHNSON, PEOPLE VS. PROPERTY RACE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN
HOuSrNC. 21 (1947)
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of racial restrictions so that they shall be permanently barred to the
excluded groups; this practice is alleged by real estate promoters to
mike the land values secure.7
When a covenant is executed by a number of parties, it is always
officially recorded with the competent office of the county or city so
that it serves constructive notice to all subsequent purchasers or occu',
pants including 'the remotest grantees and tenants who must be aware
of its terms of restriction." It is not infrequent that the latest buyer
and seller were not parties to the original agreement with the burdens
of which they were charged.
Regarding the period of validity most covenants run from ten to
sixty years with provision of automatic renewals while a number of
them carry no time limit and are therefore perpetual.9
While it is true that the institution of racial covenants is directed
against Negroes who have suffered most as the largest single minority
race in the United States, the restrictions are equally applicable t&
other minorities as well. The tendency is to use vague generic terms
such as "Non-Caucasians" or "colored persons" to include all persons
not of pure white blood in the restricted groups. Nevertheless, specific
covenants have been executed against persons whose ancestry can b
traced to Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Filipino, Hindu, Ethiopian,
Arabian, Syrian, Persian, Armenian, Mexican, Greek, or Spanish
extraction; as well as against Jews, Latin-Americans, Hawaiians, Puerto
Ricans, and American Indians." In some instances the restricted mem-
berg are identified by indirect reference such as Armenians were called
"descendants of former residents of the Turkish Empire," or Chinese
were called "members of the Mongolian race."' In others exclusion is
extended to religious groups, some of whom belong to the white race,
Thus we find that covenants have been used against ownership or occu-
pancy of property "by any person who belongs to any race, creed
or sect which holds, recognizes or observes any day of the week other
than the first day of the week to be the Sabbath. I'l2 This would
certainly include the Seventh Day Adventists, many of whom are pure
7Id. at 10-11.
s Attorney General Clark, note 3 supra, at 27
0 Id. at 26.
10 Miller, L., The Power of Restricive Covenants, 36 SuRVEY GRAPHIc, (No. 1
January 1947), 46, Consolidated Brief for Petitioners in Hurd v. Hodge and Uraiolo
v. Hodge (Nos. 290-291) at 90-91. Note 1 supra.
11 Miller, L. Race Restrctions on Ownership or .Occupancy of Land, 7 LAWYERS
GumD Rxvw 99; Shelley v. Kraemer (No. 72), note 1 supra.
12 Abrams, A., Homes for Aryans Only, 3 CommENTARY (No. 5, May 1947)' 4al.
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white persons! In still others, "Jews or persons of objectionable nation-
ality" or "any person of the Semitic race, blood, or Jews, Hebrews,
Persians, and Syrians" have also been named.'" Finally restriction has
been leveled against "persons of a race whose death rate is at a higher
rate than that of the white or Caucasian race."" The extremity of the
restrictions is governed only by the whim and caprice of the coven-
antor and the standard of their inclusiveness is measured only by
the degree of his intolerance, bigotry, and prejudice. The sole excep-
tion to racial restrictions is found in some covenants where proscribed
persons can live on the premises of the restricted property only because
they are there as servants, janitors, or chauffeurs. The convenience of
availability of manual labor has made this exception a standard pro-
vision in title deeds issued by many real estate companies."
Unreasonable as these restrictions were, the sinister mode of their
application has in some cases defied imagination of decent society In
the recent case of Pearce v. Crocker in the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County (No. 508, 294) it was found that the plaintiffs obtained
a decree to evict the white defendant Crocker's wife, who is a three-
fourths Seneca Indian, and their three daughters from a home in West-
wood, which they both own but in which only the husband can live
because he is a white against whom the racial restriction does not apply
A few years ago a Chinese university professor who is married to a
white American bought a home in a restricted area in West Los
Angeles, but because of his national origin and in spite of the mixed
marriage they were forced to sell it at a loss; the wife can stay but the
husband cannot in a home of their own. In another case in Maryland,
Garber v. Tushm,'8 we find that the plaintiffs sought an injunction to
prevent Mrs. Tushin, who is a gentile, from permitting her husband,
who is a Jew, against whom the restriction applies, to occupy the
home owned by both. In all these cases it was maintained by plaintiffs
or: parties who assert an interest in them that the continuing occupancy
of the restricted persons was causing "irreparable damage" to them!
It has been observed with an ironic note that even under the Nazi
"Nuremberg Laws" the members of a mixed marriage family would
not have been required to move from their homes!'7
13 Consolidated Brief, note 10 supra, at 91.
'4Id. at 91.
"' Long, Race Restrictive Covenants it Housing, note 6 supra at 21.
1 Garber v. Tushin, Equity 12894, Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Maryland.
complaint filed April ii, 1947, the Washington Post, September 17, 1947, p. 1, col. 3.
17 Consolidated. Brief, note 10 suPra at 92.
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In April z944, the Blackstone Park Home Owners Association of.
Detroit, Michigan took action to evict Mrs. Joseph G. Bell and her-
eight children from their home because she and her husband were of
mixed European and Chinese parentage. The husband's father was
American and the wife's English; both had Chinese mothers. The
Association has a racial covenant which permits only persons of "pure,
white, unmixed, Caucasian race" to reside in the area in question. 8
Thus in a pure white -community an Eurasian cannot be regarded as
or pass for a Caucasian, and when a Seventh Day Adventist is subject
to a restricted covenant, even a Caucasian is not a Caucasian.
The enumeration of some minorities as a restricted group suggests
a certain regional pattern reflecting the particular prejudice of the
locality concerned. In general, the Negroes are singled out as a class
in the South and the Midwest, whereas in the Southwest it is common to
exclude Mexicans and American citizens of Mexican descent, e. g.,
"persons commonly called Mexicans." In the Pacific Coast states,
restrictions apply to all "non-Caucasians" which would obviously
include Asiatics.10
With a view to showing the order of precedence taken by minority
groups other than Negroes as excluded persons, it is interesting to
study the following table prepared by the Department of Race Rela-
tions of the American Missionary Association:20
TABLE 14
Groups Other Than Negroes, Considered Objectionable by Neighbor-
hood Improvement Associations, Chicago and Detroit, 1944
Number Per cent
Japanese, Chinese, Mongolians, Non-Caucasians .... 16 31.3
M exicans ...................................................................... 5 9.9
Jew s .............................................................................. 6 11.7
Italians, Poles, Greeks ................................................ 3 5.9
N one ............................................................................ 16 31.3
N ot given .................................................................... 5 9.9
Total (including repetitions) .................................. 51 100.00
From the above figures it is evident that next to the Negroes "Asi-
atics" or "Orientals" are considered as most objectionable by almost
a third of the orgamzations which .expressed their opinion. They are
18 MONTHLY SUMmARY OF EVENTS AND TRENDS IN RACE RELATIONS (May 1944).
10 McGovney, D. 0., Racial Resdential Segregation by State Court Enforcement of
Restrictive Agreements, Conditions in Deeds is Unconstitutional, 33 CALIF. L. R. 15,(1945).20 Long & Johnson, note 6 supra, at 47-48.
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followed by Jews, Mexicans, Italians, Poles, and Greeks among the
undesirable groups. This is at any rate an accurate report on the
situation in Chicago and Detroit to which these figures apply In the
Pacific Coast states, particularly in California where racial prejudice
against the Chinese had a long historical background, it would be
naive to think that they are regarded with more social graces than the
Negroes within the framework of restrictive covenants. If it seems at
times that the Chinese have been accorded in some communities a
little better treatment than other "non-Caucasians," it is probably
because once they were given an opportunity to reside in a white
district. They, like any other people, would be found to possess about
as many traits of virtues and failings as their white neighbors. In
general, it must be conceded that in the estimation of the covenantors
the yellow race is little better than the black race.
The question of enforcement of racial covenants usually comes up
when a neighboring property owner who is a party thereto or other-
wise subject to the terms thereof seeks to redress their violation by
injunctive relief in the courts. The relief sought usually takes one or
more of the following forms: (i) prevention of occupancy by the
excluded person, (2) his eviction from the premises of his property;
(3) forfeiture of his title deeds if such a penalty for his ownership
is included in the covenants.2
LEGAL STATUS OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS PRIOR
TO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS OF 1948
According to the Attorney General of the United States, restrictive
covenants of one kind or another were enforced by courts in nineteen
states and in the District of Columbia.22 These states are Alabama,
California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Caro-
lina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The other
twenty-nine states are silent on the issue.
It is interesting to note that the first case involving the enforcement
of a restrictive covenant was decided in California and concerned the
right of a Chinese to lease a laundry site in San Diego. In 1892 the
Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Cali-
fornia refused to enforce a covenant in a deed that the grantee should
never rent the property "to a Chinaman.""- The court said:
', Attorney General Clark, note 3 supra, at 27
22 Attorney General Clark, note 3 supra, at 40-42.
23 Gandolfo v. Hartmen, 49 Fed. 181 (1892).
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It would be a very narrow construction of the constitutional amendment in
question, and of the decisions based upon it, and a very restricted applica-
tion of the broad principles upon which both the Amendment and the
decisions proceed, to hold that while state and municipal legislatures are
forbidden to discriminate against Chinese in their legislation, a citizen of
a state may lawfully do so by contract which the courts may enforce. Any
result inhibited by the Constitution can no more be accomplished by con-
tract of individual citizens than by legislation, and the courts should no
more enforce the one than the other.
The court was of the opinion that enforcement of this covenant
would be in violation of the equal protection of the laws under the Four-
teenth Amendment.2' It was unfortunate that the ruling of this case
was not supported by other courts in subsequent cases involving the
same question and was completely ignored by the Supreme Court of
California in 199 when it held that a racial covenant was valid
because it was a restriction on "use. 25
Before the Supreme Court decisions of May 3, 1948, were rendered,
it was commonly believed that the question of judicial enforcement of
restrictive covenants in their constitutional aspects had been settled
by the Supreme Court in Corrigan v. Buckley.26 In that case Corrigan,
Buckley, and twenty-eight other white property owners in the District
of Columbia made a covenant not to sell or lease their land to Negroes.
Later Corrigan contracted to sell her lot to Curtis, a Negro, where-
upon Buckley filed a suit in equity in the trial court of the District of
Columbia naming both Corrigan and Curtis as defendants and enjoin-
ing the former from selling and the latter from buying or occupying
that lot. The defendants moved to disnss the suit on the ground that
the covenant in question is void because it violates the Fifth, the
24 The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jursdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." The amendment came into force as a part of the Constitution on July 28,
1868. Eighteen years later in the celebrated case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins (118 U. S. 356,
6 S. Ct. 1064) the Supreme Court held that a Chinese laundryman who was denied a
license to operate his business was denied the equal protection of the laws under that
Amendment. That decision also established the meaning of the word "person" which is
not to be restricted by the definition of the word "citizen" in the first clause but is to be
taken to include all individuals within the United States regardless of race, color or
nationality. In the same year (1886) the Court held that the word "persons" also
applies to corporations. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co. 118 U. S.
394, 6 S. Ct. 1132 (1886).
25 Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596 (1920).
26 271 U. S. 323, 46 S. Ct. 521 (1926).
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Thirteenth, and the Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.
These motions were denied, the injunction was granted, and the judge-
ment was confirmed by the Court of Appeals. The case then went to
the Supreme Court on appeal and not on certiorari.
The Supreme Court was primarily concerned with the question of
whether a substantial issue had been raised that would confer juris-
diction on the Court. With regard to the due process of law clause of
the Fifth Amendment the Court held that:
This contention likewise cannot serve as a jurisdictional basis for the appeal.
Assuming that such a contention, if of a substantial character, might have
constituted ground for an appeal under paragraph 3 of the code provision,
it was not raised by the petition for the appeal or by an assignment of error
either in the Court of Appeals or in this court, and it likewise is lacking in
substance.
Secondly the Fourteenth Amendment was not applicable in this case
for the simple reason that the District of Columbia is not a state to
which that Amendment bears its legal relationship. Referring to the
Thirteenth Amendment the Court held that restrictive covenants did
not create slavery or involuntary servitude within the meaning of that
Amendment and therefore they are not void ab initio. The Court con-
cluded "that neither the constitutional nor statutory questions relied
on as grounds for the appeal to this Court have any substantial quality
or color of merit, or afford any jurisdictional basis for the appeal.1 27
Thus it is clear that the central question whether courts can enforce
restrictive covenants was not decided since it was not raised in that
case. Yet the mistaken impression that it had been settled persisted
tor more than twenty years before the confusion created by that
decision was finally swept away by the Supreme Court recently 28
As it has already been noted, the question of racial residential segre-
gation by state legislation or municipal ordinance had been declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1917 in the famous case of
Buchanan v. Warley.0 In that case an ordinance of the city of Louis-
ville, Kentucky prohibited colored persons from residing in blocks
where the greater number of residents were white persons and the
same prohibition applies to the latter in blocks where the greater num-
ber of residents were colored. Buchanan, a white property owner,
brought action against Wharley, a Negro, for the specific performance
27271 U. S. 323, 331, 46 S. Ct. 521, 524 (1926).
28 See infra.
29 Note 2 supra.
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of a contract of sale of Buchanan's lot to Wharley Wharley argued
that he was excused from the obligations of the contract inasmuch as
he was not entitled to occupancy of the property winch was a condition
of the sale. The Court said:
The concrete question here is May the occupancy, and, necessarily, the
purchase and sale of property of which occupancy is an incident, be in-
hibited by the States, or by one of its municipalities, solely because of the
color of the proposed occupant of the premises? That one may dispose of
his property, subject only to the control of lawful enactments curtailing
that right in the public interest, must be conceded. The question now pre-
sented makes it pertinent to enquire into the constitutional right of the
white man to sell his property to a colored man, having in view the legal
status of the purchaser and occupant30
To tls question the Court answered:
We think tus attempt to prevent the alienation of the property in question
to a person of color was not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the
State, and is in direct violation of the fundamental law enacted in the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Constitution preventing state interference with
property rights except by due process of law That being the case the ordi-
nance cannot stand. 1
Restrictive covenants had not come into extensive use before the
migration of Negroes from the South to the North and the Middle
West in the second decade of the current century and before the
process of their urbanization took momentum during and after that
decade. At first they were used as a subsidiary weapon to state and
municipal enactments m enforcing racial segregation, but after the
Supreme Court invalidated this pattern of statutory segregation they
became the primary means of perpetuating the exclusion of minority
groups from good urban areas. In recent years the wholesale and still
expanding use of tis instrument has rendered practically all newly
developed urban areas inaccessible to colored persons while similar
covenants are concluded to fringe the old established colored or other
minority districts. In the words of the Report of the President's Com-
mittee on Civil Rights, the present situation is that
where old ghettos are surrounded by restrictions, and new subdivisions
are also encumbered by them, there is practically no place for the people
against whom the restrictions are directed to go. Since minorities have been
forced into crowded slum areas, and must ultimately have access to larger
so 245 U. S. at 75.
81 Id. at 52.
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living areas, the restrictive covenant is providing our democratic society
with one of its most challenging problems.82
It has been reported that before the recent decisions of the Supreme
Court there were approximately 250 suits pending in the courts of the
various states; of these suits it has been estimated that nineteen were
filed in the courts of California. There were two cases which came
before the Superior Court of Los Angeles County and in which two
American citizens, one of Chinese and the other of Korean descent
and both veterans decorated in the last war, bought their homes in
a restricted district and were sued to vacate their premises. Before
these cases were tried on their merits, defendants petitioned the Su-
preme Court of California for a writ of prohibition which would pre-
vent the trial court from proceeding with the case. The petition was
denied and both cases reached the Supreme Court of the United States
on certiorari. On May io, 1948, one week after the leading decisions
were pronounced, the petition was granted and "the order denying a
writ of prohibition is vacated and the case is remanded to the Supreme
Court of California in order to enable it to reconsider its ruling."3 So
far as the writer knows, these two were the only cases which originated
in Los Angeles and went to the Supreme Court from California.
It is significant that the President's Committee on Civil Rights in
its report released in 1947 recommended "a program of action" calling
for "the elimination of segregation, based on race, color, creed, or
national origin, from American life." 4 In the field of housing it spe-
cifically recommended the "enactment by the states of laws outlawing
restrictive covenants" and the "renewed court attack, with interven-
tion by the Department of Justice""5 upon them. These measures are
considered necessary and urgent so as "to strengthen the right to
equality of opportunity" which should be enjoyed by all minority
groups. The Report further comments:
The effectiveness of restrictive covenants depends in the last analysis on
court orders enforcing the private agreement. The power of the state is thus
utilized to bolster discriminatory practices. The Committee believes that
every effort must be made to prevent this abuse. We would hold this belief
under any circumstances, under present conditions, when severe housing
32 To SECURE THESE RIGHTs, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, 69 (1947, Government Printing Office)
88 Tom D. Amer v. Superior Court of Calif., in and for the County of Los Angeles,
Supreme Court of the United States, (No. 429), Yin Ktrn v. same, (No. 430) 68 S. Ct.
1069 (1948).
34 Note 32 supra at 166.
s1 Id. at 169.
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shortages are already causing hardship for many people of the country, we
are especially emphatic in recommending measures to alleviate the situation.
THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION
On May 3, 1948 Mr. Chief Justice Vinson delivered two separate
opinions on four cases"8 originating from Missouri, Michigan, and the
District of Columbia and all involving the validity of court enforce-
ment of restrictive covenants against Negro property owners who are
direct participants m these cases. Both decisions were rendered by a
unanimous court of six members, the other three having disqualified
themselves from the cases; it was learned that two of the justices were
owners of property covered by restrictive covenants.37 An unprece-
dented amount of public interest was displayed in the outcome of these
cases by the fact that twenty-four briefs of Anucus Curiae were filed
by organizations and individuals, the largest number ever presented
before the Supreme Court in a private civil case."s The government of
the United States itself, as represented by the Attorney General,
argued as a friend of the court against the judicial enforceability of
restrictive covenants; these arguments were ably presented in a
learned and comprehensive brief with copious citations of authorities.
All these cases came to the Supreme Court on certiorari to the
lower courts from which they were appealed. In the Missouri case of
Shelley v. Kraemer (No. 72, October Term, i947) petitioner Shelley
and his wife, who are Negroes, bought on August ii, 1945, a piece of
property in St. Louis containing a recorded agreement which provides
in part:
no part of said property or any portion thereof shall be, for said term of
Fifty-years, occupied by any person not of the Caucasian race, it being in-
tended hereby to restrict the use of said property for said period of time
against the occupancy as owners or tenants of any portion of said property
for resident or other purpose by the people of the Negro or Mongolian Race.
On October 9, 1945 respondents who were owners of other property
but parties to this restrictive agreement brought suit in the circuit
30 The two District of Columbia cases were consolidated for trial by the District
Court.
37 Justices Robert H. Jackson, Wiley B. Rutlege, and Stanley F Reed took no part
in the consideration or decision of these cases. The first two were reported to own
covenanted property. New York Times, May 9, 1948.
38 Among these were the National Association for ,the Advancement of Colored
People, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the American Federation of Labor,
the American Jewish Congress, the American Civil Liberties Union, the American
Indian Congress, the American Association for the United Nations, the Committee on
Social Action of the Congregational Church, the Council of Protestant Churches of
New York, the American Veterans Committee, etc.
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court of that city to restrain the petitioners from taking possession of
the property and to forfeit their title to the same. The trial court
denied the respondents their requested relief but on the ground that
the restrictive agreement in question was not effective due to a lack of
sufficient signatures. The Supreme Court of Missouri, however, re-
versed the judgment of the lower court which was directed to grant
the relief for which respondent had prayed, it held that the restrictive
agreement was effective and its enforcement did not violate any rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. When the decision was rendered,
petitioners were occupying the property as their home.
The second case is McGkee v. Sipes (No. 87, October Term, 1947)
There petitioners bought and occupied a piece of property in Detroit,
Michigan on November 30, 1944. The property in question contained
a restrictive covenant executed in June, 1934 and subsequently re-
corded and effective until January i, 1950, providing as follows: "This
property shall not be used or occupied by any person or persons except
those of the Caucasian race." On January 30, x947 respondents who
are owners of other property subject to the terms of the restrictive
agreement brought suit in the circuit court of Wayne County which
after a hearing ordered petitioners to move from the property within
ninety days and restrained them from using or occupying the premises
in the future. The decree was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Michigan setting aside the petitioners' contention that they had been
denied rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con-
stitution.
The third and the fourth of these cases are Hurd v. Hodge (No. 290,
October Term, 1947) and Urciolo v. Hodge (No. 291, October Term,
1947) and they came to the Supreme Court from the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. In both cases petitioners are
Negroes and bought property in Washington, D C. from white owners
under deeds which contained the following covenant: " that said
lot shall never be rented, leased, sold, transferred or conveyed unto
any Negro or colored person, under a penalty of Two Thousand Dol-
lars ($2,000) which shall be a lien against said property" The cove-
nant was made in 19o6 but does not impose any limitation of time. As
in the other cases, respondents, who own other property but are parties
to the covenant, brought suit in the District Court which consolidated
the two cases for trial purposes and subsequently entered a judgment
nullifying the title deeds of the Negro petitioners, enjoining petitioners
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Urciolo and Ryan, the white property. owners and sellers, from leasing,
selling, or conveying the properties to any Negro or colored person,
and directing the Negro petitioners to vacate the premises within sixty
days. The judgment was affirmed, with one strong dissent,' on appeal
by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
Although in both decisions judicial enforcement of restrictive cove-
nants has been declared invalid, different legal arguments -were used
by the Court in arriving at the same conclusion. In the cases from
Missouri and Michigan, the decision was based on the proposition that
"in granting judicial enforcement of the restrictive covenants in these
cases, the States have demed petitioners the equal protection of the
laws" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and that judicial
action constitutes the kind of state action within the meaning of the
equal protection clause of that Amendment. Having so decided, the
Court did not go into the other constitutional questions such as whether
petitioners have also been deprived of property without due process of
law or denied privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.
In the District of Columbia cases, the Court applied the first section
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and gave consideration to the public
policy of the United States in support of its decision.
It must be indicated at this point that in neither decision was the
validity of the restrictive covenant itself attacked or questioned by the
Court. In fact, the Court made it clear in Shelley v. Kraemer that "the
restrictive covenants standing alone cannot be regarded as a violation
of any rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment.
So long as the purposes of these agreements are effectuated by volun-
tary adherence to their terms, it would appear that there has been no
action by the State and the provisions of the Amendment have not been
violated." In Hurd v. Hodge, it was likewise held that "the Statute
[the Civil Rights Act of 1866] does not invalidate private restrictive
agreements so long as the purposes of those agreements are achieved
by the parties through voluntary adherence to the terms."
89Justice Edgerton dissented on five general grounds, each independent of the
other four, as follows: (1) the covenants are void as unreasonable restraints on aliena-
tion, (2) they are void because they are contrary to public policy; (3) their enforce-
ment by injunction is inequitable; (4) it violates the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment; and (5) it violates the Civil Rights Act (Revised Statutes, Sec. 1978,
8. U. S. C., Sec. 42). In addition to these he also based his dissent on two special
grounds: (1) enforcement of the covenant would defeat its original purpose since the
neighborhood is no longer white and since Negroes will pay more than whites for the
same property; and (2) the injunctions are against both transfer and occupancy and
broader than the covenant which did not forbid use or occupancy. Quoted in Consoli-
dated Briefs, 5.
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
It is worth noting that the court has in these decisions clarified its
own ruling in Corrigan v. Buckley which, as it has already been re-
ferred to above, had been for twenty-two years misinterpreted as
having settled the issue of enforceability of restrictive covenants."°
"The only constitutional issue which the appellants had raised in the
lower courts, and hence the only constitutional issue before this court
on appeal," said the Court in Shelley v Kraemer, "was the validity of
the covenant agreements as such." The question whether they can be
enforced by courts under the Fifth Amendment was not "properly
before the Court." "Accordingly," the Court concluded, "the appeal
was dismissed for want of a substantial question. Nothing in the
opinion of this Court, therefore, may properly be regarded as an
adjudication on the merits of the constitutional issues presented by
these cases, which raise the question of the validity, not of the private
agreements as such, but of the judicial enforcement of those agree-
ments." This conclusion was repeated in Hurd v. Hodge and Urciolo
v. Hodge.
The Court also made a distinction between the present cases and
those involving racial residential segregation by state enactment or
municipal ordinance which had been ruled in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment in Buchanan v. Warley"' in i917 and in subse-
quent ° cases.
In the present cases, the Court maintained that the pattern or scope
of discrimination is a matter of agreement among private individuals
and that "participation of the State consists in the enforcement of the
restrictions so defined." The question at issue is, does this participation
by the courts of the state constitute an action of the state within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment? After citing a number of
authorities, the Court concludes:
The short of the matter is that from the time of the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment until the present, it has been the consistent ruling of
this Court that the action of the States to which the Amendment has ref-
erence, includes action of state courts and state judicial officials. Although,
in construing the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, differences have
from time to time been expressed as to whether particular types of state
action may be said to offend the Amendment's prohibitory provisions, it
has never been suggested that state court action is immunized from the
40 McGovney, note 19 supra at 34-36.
41 Note 2 supra.
42 Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668, 47 S. Ct. 471 (1927), City of Richmond v.
Deans, 281 U. S. 704, 50 S. Ct. 459 (1930).
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operation of those provisions simply because the act is that of the judicial
branch of the state government.
The Court then proceeds to consider the question whether there has
been state action m the instant cases "in the full and complete sense
of the phrase." It says:
We have no doubt that there has been state action in these cases in the full
and complete sense of the phrase. The undisputed facts disclose that peti-
tioners were willing purchasers of properties upon which they desired to
establish homes. The owners of the properties were willing sellers, and con-
tracts of sale were accordingly consummated. It is clear that but for the
active intervention of state courts, supported by the full panoply of state
power, petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties in question
without restraint. These are cases in which the States have made avail-
able to such individuals the full coercive power of government to deny to
petitioners, on the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of property
rights in premises which petitioners are willing and financially able to ac-
quire and which the grantors are willing to sell. The difference between
judicial enforcement and non-enforcement of the restrictive covenants is
the difference to petitioners between being denied rights of property avail-
able to other members of the community and being accorded full enjoyment
of those rights on an equal footing.
The Court fully realizes that the task of determining whether an act
of the state violates constitutional provisions cannot be undertaken
lightly; "where, however, it is clear that the action of the state vio-
lates the terms of the fundamental charter, it is the obligation of this
Court so to declare." The Court therefore concludes:
Whatever else the framers sought to achieve, it is clear that the matter of
primary concern was the establishment of equality in the enjoyment of basic
civil and political rights and the preservation of those rights from dis-
cnminatory action on the part of the States based on considerations of race
and color. Seventy-five years ago this Court announced that the provisions
of the Amendment are to be construed with this purpose in mind. Upon
full consideration, we have concluded that in these cases the States have
acted to deny petitioners the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
According to the opinion of the Court, the question of restriction
on use did not arise in these cases. The restrictions were entirely
directed "toward a designated class of persons" which is defined wholly
in terms of "race or color." Regarding the respondents' argument that
the courts may also be requested to enforce restrictive covenants
against white persons, the Court has not found any case supporting it;
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even if there were any, it would have been of no avail for the reason
that "equal protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscrin-
nate imposition of inequalities."
In the District of Columbia cases, the Court, as it has been noted,
cited as one of the two legal bases for its ruling Section 1978 of the
Revised Statutes, which, derived from the first Section of the Civil
Rights Act of i866, provides as follows: "All citizens of the United
States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is
enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property" Since all the petitioners in
the two cases are found to be citizens of the United States, and since
the District of Columbia must be included within the phrase "every
State and Territory," there can be no doubt as to "the construction to
be given to the relevant provisions of the Civil Rights Act in their
application to the Courts of the District of Columbia." The Court says:
That the Negro petitioners have been denied that right by virtue of the
action of the federal courts of the District is clear. The Negro petitioners
entered into contracts of sale with willing sellers for the purchase of prop-
erties upon which they desired to establish homes. Solely because of their
race and color they are confronted with orders ot court divesting their titles
in the properties and ordering that the premises be vacated. White sellers,
one of whom is a petitioner here, have been enjoined from selling the prop-
erties to any Negro or colored person. Under such circumstances, to suggest
that the Negro petitioners have been accorded the same rights as white
citizens to purchase, hold and convey real property is to reject the plain
meaning of language. We hold that the action of the District Court directed
against the Negro purchasers and the white sellers denies rights intended
by Congress to be protected by the Civil Rights Act and that, consequently,
the action cannot stand.
The other legal basis for this decision is to be found in the public
policy of the United States against which it will be to enforce the
restrictive covenants in these cases. In this connection the court states:
We are here concerned with action of federal courts of such a nature that
if taken by the courts of a State would violate the prohibitory provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Shelley vs. Kraemer, supra. It is not consistent
with the public policy of the United States to permit federal courts in the
Nation's capital to exercise general equitable powers to compel action
denied the state courts where such state action has been held to be violative
of the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws. We cannot presume that
the public policy of the United States manifests a lesser concern for the
protection of such basic rights against discriminatory action of federal courts
than against such action taken by the courts of the states.
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the unammous opinion,
stated that the rule of good conscience in equity ought to be sufficient
to justify the holding of the decision. It was stated that "in good con-
science, it cannot be the exercise of a sound judicial discretion by a
federal court to grant the relief here asked for when the authorization
of such an injunction by the states of the Union violates the Constitu-
tion. This is to me a sufficient and conclusive ground for reaching the
court's result."
On May 3o, 1948 the Supreme Court in the light of the two decisions
rendered the week before, reversed the judgment of the lower court in
a Columbus case in which a Negro preacher was enjoined from occupy-
ing the parsonage of his own church.48
GENERAL EFFECTS OF THE DECISION
Although the Supreme Court invalidated statutory racial segregation
M 1917, thirty-one years elapsed before it was prepared to declare
its position on the judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants. During
this long period restrictive covenants developed into a formidable
instrument which has effectively barred almost all mnnority groups in
the United States from predominantly white urban neighborhoods.
Now that they have been denied the legal force of execution it is appro-
priate to speculate upon the general effects of the recent decisions. If
one can hazard a guess into the future, it is unlikely that there will be
a wholesale invasion of colored persons into white residential districts.
First, the white property owner must be willing to sell or to rent, and
the colored person must be able to pay for what he wants; it takes
two to make a bargain which above all is governed by the economic
laws of supply and demand. Secondly the social force of racial preju-
dice must still be reckoned with, since it is the freedom of those who
share common prejudices to enter into private covenants -of racial
restrictions. While it is true that these covenants will be in the nature
of "gentlemen's agreements" and their effectiveness will depend upon
the good faith of the parties who conclude them, their continued exist-
ence will keep alive the tradition of racial prejudice in many communi-
ties where minority groups reside in large numbers.
In areas where there are already mixed racial groups, it is natural
to see white property owners wanting to make way for them and it is
48 Trustees of the Monroe Avenue Church of Christ v. Perlans, No. 153, 68 S. Ct.
1068 (1947).
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reasonable to expect that a perceptible change of occupancy will be
seen in these neighborhoods as time goes by It is also probable that
excluded persons of substantial means may now live in places which
hitherto were inaccessible to them. In general, however, the racial
composition of residential areas which are exclusively or predominantly
white will not be altered for social and economic reasons.
The real significance of the latest decisions lies in the fact that
restrictive covenants can no longer be used as a legal weapon of enforc-
ing racial segregation. The judicial arm of the American government
will not be on the side of those who wish to maintain it as an oddity of
American life. These private agreements have been shorn of the
coercive power of the state for their sanction and they merely repre-
sent a manifestation of personal feelings of the parties concerned
towards other races. Thus an important pervasive gap is closed between
American ideal and practice regarding the enjoyment of basic civil
rights in the United States.
From the Chinese point of view these decisions must be regarded as
another landmark in their struggle for equality before the laws of the
United States, and for that reason alone they must be hailed as a great
act of judicial progress as was the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion
Laws on December 17, 1943.
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
Apart from the constitutional aspects of the validity of restrictive
covenants it has been argued that the United States cannot enforce
these covenants without violating her treaty obligations as a signatory
to the Charter of the United Nations." Article 55 (c) of the Charter
provides that the United Nations shall promote "universal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Article 56
prescribes: "all Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate
action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of
the purposes set forth in Article 552'45 The mandatory feature of these
provisions makes it clear that the United States should refrain from
any action which will impair the enjoyment of "human rights and
44 Consolidated Briefs at 108-ill.
45 In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy, with whom Mr. Justice Rut-
ledge joins, in the recent Oyama case involving the constitutionality of the California
Alien Land Law, it was said. "Moreover, this nation has recently pledged itself,
through the United Nations Charter, to promote respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language
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fundamental freedoms" on racial distinctions; they impose an obliga-
tion on the government of the United States not to lend its aid to the
perpetuation of discriminations depriving any person of his human
rights and fundamental freedoms because of his race or color. Obvi-
ously it does not make any difference whether such aid is given by the
legislative, executive, or judicial branch of the American government
so long as the action is a direct and official action of that government.
If judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants can be construed as a
state action under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, it
can no less be interpreted as a, governmental action which violates
Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations. The Supreme
Court has found it unnecessary to go into the international phase of
restrictive covenants, but the clarity of the Charter provisions leaves
little doubt as to the cogency of the arguments advanced. It is urged
by the Attorney General of the United States that " even if the
decrees below [in the cases before the Supreme Court] are not stricken
on specific constitutional grounds, they may properly be set aside as
being inconsistent with the public policy of the United States."'"
The question of restrictive covenants came up in a Canadian case in
which the Ontario High Court held that a restriction against ownership
of land by "Jews or persons of objectionable nationality" was invalid
under Dominion public policy as well as because it was a void restraint
on alienation of property under common law Insofar as it is a matter
of public policy to deny its enforcement, the court relied on the
Charter of the United Nations to which Canada is a signatory and
indicated that the objectives of the covenant are contrary to those
of the Charter.47
On November i9, 1946 the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted unanimously the following resolution.
and religion. The Alien Land Law stands as a barrier to the fulfillment of that national
pledge. Its inconsistency with the Charter, which has been duly ratified and adopted
by the United States, is but one more reason why the statute must be condemned. And
so in origin, purpose, administration and effect, the Alien Land Law does violence to
the high ideals of the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United
Nations." Mr. Justice Black, with whom Mr. justice Douglas agrees, asks in his con-
curring opinion. "How can this nation be faithful to this international pledge if state
laws which bar land ownership and occupancy by aliens on account of race are per-
mitted to be enforced?" Oyama v. State of California, 68 S. Ct. 269 (1948). It is
believed that this was the first time that some members of the Supreme Court had
taken judicial cognizance of the United Nations Charter, the violation of which was one
more reason why the California Alien Land Law should be declared unconstitutional.
46 Attorney General, note 3 supra at 102.
47 Re Drummond Wren, 4 Dominion L. Rep. 674 (1945). Further the court said.
"The consequences of judicial approbation of such a covenant is portentous. If sale of a
piece of land can be prohibited to Jews, it can equally be prohibited to Protestants,
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The General Assembly declares that it is in the higher interests of humanity
to put an immediate end to religious and so-called racial persecutions and
discrimination, and calls on the Governments and responsible authorities to
conform both to the letter and to the spirit of the Charter of the United
Nations, and to take the most prompt and energetic steps to that end. 48
Although the resolution lacks the legal force of the Charter which as a
treaty is "the supreme law of the land" in the United States it is diffi-
cult to resist the strong moral obligation implied in the acceptance of
this unequivocal recommendation by the members of the United
Nations. In this connection it is fair to point out the constructive
position taken by the government of the United States on discrimna-
tory practices from the following letter"9 of May 8, 1946 by the then
Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson to the Fair Employment
Practices Committee:
The existence of discrimination against minority groups in this country
has an adverse effect upon our relations with other countries. We are
reminded over and over by some foreign newspapers and spokesmen, that
our treatment of various minorities leaves much to be desired. While some-
times these pronouncements are exaggerated and unjustified, they all too
frequently point with accuracy to some form of discrimination because of
race, creed, color, or national origin. Frequently we find it next to impos-
sible to formulate a satisfactory answer to our critics in other countries,
the gap between the things we stand for in principle and the facts of a par-
ticular situation may be too wide to be bridged. An atmosphere of suspicion
and resentment in a country over the way a minority is being treated in the
United States is a formidable obstacle to the development of mutual under-
standing and trust between the two countries. We will have better inter-
national relations when these reasons for suspicion and resentment have
been removed.
It is earnestly hoped that the federal government will continue to
assume its vigilant leadership in championing the cause of unfettered
enjoyment of fundamental rights by all racial groups in the United
States. The decisions we have just surveyed constitute an article of
faith in the fuller realization of these rights for which American
democracy has stood since the days of its founding.
Catholics, or other groups or denominations. If the sale of one piece of land can be
prohibited, the sale of other pieces of land can likewise be prohibited. In my opinion
nothing could be more calculated to create or deepen divisions between existing
religions and ethnic groups in this Province, or in this country, than the sanction of a
method of land transfer which would permit the segregation and confinement of par-
ticular groups to particular business or residential areas, or conversely, would exclude
particular groups from particular business or residential areas."
4s United Nations General Assembly Journal, 1st Session, No. 75, at 957
49 Attorney General, note 3 supra at 119-20.
